Titlebook: Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union; Guido S. Merzoni Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Incentive Contract

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Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union978-3-642-57332-3Series ISSN 1431-1933 Series E-ISSN 2197-7178

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Introduction,Many economic games are played by delegates, or agents, acting on behalf of their principals, who are the main interested parties.

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Strategic delegation in the trade union,After having seen strategic delegation at work within firms, in this chapter we study how it may affect the organisation and the activity of the trade union.

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Strategic delegation in firms competing under incomplete information,tivity. However, there is not such a thing as “the firm”. Firms are different from each other and their internal organisation should not be taken as an exogenous variable. Furthermore, firms do not exist in isolation; they interact with each other within markets. The structure of the market the firm

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,Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion,to become more observable, state their intentions and define their role. In this chapter, we analyse the possibility that incentive contracts for delegates could be used by principals to sustain co-operation, studying an application to Cournot oligopoly. It is shown that collusion is a sub-game perf

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Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure,gated games. However, the payoff structure of such games is not changed by the act of delegation itself. In this chapter, I study the case where the act of delegation changes the delegated game’s payoffs, so that a sequence of delegation decisions have a dynamic effect, shaping the evolution of the

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