Titlebook: Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union; Guido S. Merzoni Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Incentive Contract

低位的人或事

cinder

,Delegation contracts’ observability and collusion,ect equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly game between two firms, where, as in the previous chapter, the choice of output is delegated by each owner to a manager, and the managers’ incentive schemes are observable and renegotiable.

Ceramic

Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure,strategic interaction that the principal is involved in. Principals compete between each other to acquire new delegates as they become available, and this competition modifies their relative strategic strength over time.

裙带关系

Conclusions,ompensate them through incentive contracts, modifies firms’ strategy space and allows them to attain equilibria that are different from the one which would have been reached were the owners directly playing the product market game.

FUSE

Ankylo-

客观

Fallibility

trigger

施魔法