Titlebook: Safer Systems; Proceedings of the F Felix Redmill,Tom Anderson Conference proceedings 1997 Springer-Verlag London Limited 1997 Management.S

AVID

Safe Systems Architectures for Autonomous Robots,lems which complicate the development of safe systems for autonomous vehicles. We then go on to discuss how we developed an understanding of the hazards of vehicle operation and describe the architecture of the excavator control system. In this architecture, all system actions are moderated by a saf

Wernickes-area

Ointment

Timing Aspects of Fault Tree Analysis of Safety Critical Systems, a (conventional) Fault Tree is first formalised and then is subjected to various analyses which aim at discovering if, with the given time dependencies among events, the hazard is still reachable. The method is illustrated with respect to a common case study — a gas burner system.

狂乱

我吃花盘旋

Irritate

宿醉

DIKE

,Artificial Intelligence — Genuine Hazards?,nal methods. This discussion paper examines some of the problems of introducing intelligence into safety-related systems, and explores possible alternatives to traditional methods of making safety cases for such systems.

LAVA

How to Improve Safety Critical Systems Standards,r the clarity of the requirement in respect of the ease with which it is possible to assess conformance to it. We describe guidelines for interpreting requirements to make this task more objective. The method is applied extensively to the IEC 1508 Safety Critical Standard.

消毒

Safe Systems Architectures for Autonomous Robots,systems. Potentially dangerous actions are curtailed or corrected by the safety manager. We also discuss the trade-offs which must be made between safety and economic viability in this type of machine and suggest some areas where we believe that further research is necessary.