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Titlebook: Game Theory and Applications; 3rd Joint China-Dutc Deng-Feng Li,Xiao-Guang Yang,Gen-Jiu Xu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer Nature Sing

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Aufarbeitung von Geweben und Zellenn-cooperative games with uncertain payoffs just focused on two-person zero-sum games or bimatrix games. In this paper, we consider a .-person non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoffs. First, based on credibility theory, three credibilistic criteria are introduced to define the behavior preferences of
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Allgemeine Untersuchungsmethodenology, a new ranking order relation of IFSs is proposed and the concept of Pareto Nash equilibrium solutions of matrix games with IFS payoffs is firstly defined. It is proven that the solutions of matrix games with IFS payoffs are equivalent to those of a pair of bi-objective programming models. The
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Werner Mahr,Roland Eisen,Matthias Hallere discuss the computational and complexity issues on the Shapley value in a particular multi-agent domain, a threshold cardinality matching game (TCMG). We show that the Shapley value can be calculated in polynomial time when graphs are restricted to some special graphs, such as linear graphs and th
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-96186-0 matrix analysis are possibly justifiable techniques for studying linear values. For any linear value, the payoff vector of any game is represented algebraically by the product of a column-coalitional representation matrix and the worth vector. The analysis of the structure of these representation m
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O. Foerster,A. Fröhlich,E. Wexbergive example is presented to show that the established model is feasible and effective and can provide a new way and method to analyze and solve multi mutual deterrence or conflict problems with incomplete information.
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