找回密码
 To register

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models II; Methods, Morals, and Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.Wi

[复制链接]
楼主: 延展
发表于 2025-3-25 04:06:03 | 显示全部楼层
A. Brini,F. Regonati,A. G. B. Teoliselements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
发表于 2025-3-25 11:02:24 | 显示全部楼层
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game,elements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
发表于 2025-3-25 15:15:27 | 显示全部楼层
On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.
发表于 2025-3-25 18:01:10 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-25 20:16:31 | 显示全部楼层
Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barilequilibria leaves only stationary equilibria in supergames. . ask when subgame-perfection may not pay appropriate attention to whether the group wishes to deviate from plans made, that is, to renegotiate.
发表于 2025-3-26 02:05:00 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-26 05:24:13 | 显示全部楼层
Connectedness, Smooth and Simplerstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).
发表于 2025-3-26 09:28:36 | 显示全部楼层
A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,rstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).
发表于 2025-3-26 16:27:01 | 显示全部楼层
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07365-0Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; algebra; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolu
发表于 2025-3-26 19:37:14 | 显示全部楼层
 关于派博传思  派博传思旗下网站  友情链接
派博传思介绍 公司地理位置 论文服务流程 影响因子官网 SITEMAP 大讲堂 北京大学 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
发展历史沿革 期刊点评 投稿经验总结 SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系数 清华大学 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋| 派博传思国际 ( 京公网安备110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-5-21 07:30
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博传思   京公网安备110108008328 版权所有 All rights reserved
快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表