Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models II; Methods, Morals, and Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.Wi

Coronary-Spasm

包租车船

牲畜栏

Conflagration

Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards,e rule—following and rule—enforcement rates of behavior adopted by irrigators on systems where rules are self—enforced rather than enforced by formal guards. To do this, we assume that irrigators rotate into the position of a turntaker. When in the position of a turntaker, they choose between taking

吼叫

gene-therapy

Interaction between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,ic commodity, the purely speculative nature of most of futures trading and apparent availability of unlimited funds to the traders..Interaction between the extraction policy of duopolists and their futures trading is modelled with the help of a two-stage noncooperative game with incomplete informati

不近人情

A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,set is uncertain. This characteristic lends the common-value auction model (Wilson [1977], Milgrom and Weber [19821) much of its richness. It also makes the bidder’s strategic problem more complex: laboratory observations of common-value auctions have suggested that subjects exhibit substantially mo

文艺

Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidedicts that users of open access common-pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at suboptimal rates near full rent depletion. We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the accuracy of the rent dissipation prediction for such environments.

Lipoprotein

The work of T. Kawai on exact WKB analysisis repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.

背书

General Discussion of Lie Algebras, some people are better managers than others, that some people are better negotiators, etc. At a shallow level, there is an easy explanation. Certain tasks, including performance in strategic settings, require specific skills. People who have those skills perform the tasks better than those who do not.