Titlebook: Epistemic Pluralism; Annalisa Coliva,Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen Book 2017 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under ex

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Epistemic Relativism and Pluralismd the notion that epistemic systems have a permanent and fixed structure of principles. I end with some tentative comments on the relationship between epistemic relativism and William Alston’s epistemic pluralism.

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Parametric Optimization of Decision Systems,s to draw out some of these implications, articulate and explore different versions of the view, consider its motivations and applications, and investigate its connection to other views in epistemology—in particular, epistemic relativism.

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Design Optimization of Micromixers,onceptual analysis of not being vulnerable to the so-called paradox of analysis. Moreover, explicationist epistemology is intrinsically immune to the Gettier problem. I proceed to identify three senses in which the former is inherently pluralistic. For example, it allows for a plurality of legitimat

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7936-9are cases in hand. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true. According to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Section . introduces epistemic pluralism through the work of Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, and William Alston. In the work of these au

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Conclusion and Future Research Directiont be a unified view of justification and of knowledge. After examining a few motivations for this view, I distinguish three versions of it. The first claims that the concept of justification is ambiguous and that the internalist version is compatible with the externalist one (epistemic compatibilism

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,Advisor’s Problem and Its Solutions,ells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?” Sections . and . exploit some of the upshots of Sect. . in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justif