| 书目名称 | Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs |
| 副标题 | How Peircean Semioti |
| 编辑 | Marc Champagne |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Develops a novel stance on one of the most vibrant controversies in current philosophy: “the hard problem of consciousness”.Lifts Peirce‘s difficult semiotic theory out of its inner circle of experts, |
| 丛书名称 | Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | .It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. .The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. ..Recent attempts to take qualities seriously h |
| 出版日期 | Book 2018 |
| 关键词 | Charles Sanders Peirce; Qualia; Phenomenal consciousness; Cognitive semiotics; David Chalmers; Ned Block; |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-10357-6 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-73338-8Series ISSN 1573-5834 Series E-ISSN 2542-9922 |
| issn_series | 1573-5834 |
| copyright | Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 |
发表于 2025-3-21 19:55:35
