Titlebook: Austrian Philosophy Past and Present; Essays in Honor of R Keith Lehrer,Johann Christian Marek Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Do

patriot

countenance

喧闹

The Motion of Geostationary Satellite,and extravagant metaphysical edifices on display are European. The rest of this world, excepting perhaps India, may have supplied a rich variety of mythical stories, but has built few or no elaborate metaphysical systems. On the other side, most of the most trenchant criticisms of metaphysics also e

谎言

固定某物

G. B. M. Heuvelink,F. M. van Egmondractical reasons, i.e. they cannot by themselves be reasons for doing something, for wanting to do something, or for wanting something to happen. If, for example, you did not . to stay healthy, then your belief that exercising would improve your health could not by itself be a . to exercise. Humeani

轻浮思想

Computing Variograms on Uranium Data,ine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Q

厨房里面

Mariusz Nowostawski,Julian MünsterThis paper is a comment on Rudolf Haller’s following remark:

针叶类的树

Antoni Moore,Jared Hayes,B. L. William WongHaller claims that Brentano is an empiricist Brentano is close to Comte’s positivism and to the Vienna circle in emphasizing the methods of natural science as appropriate for philosophy. He also underscores the importance of experience as a starting point of analysis. All this seems convincing.

寄生虫

Mariusz Nowostawski,Julian MünsterWe owe to Professor Haller the forceful reminder that the common habit of designating a central plank of post-positivist philosophy of science, the “Duhem-Quine Thesis”, misses out a most important “positivist” link. To rectify the situation Haller coined the expression the “Neurath Principle”.

Flavouring

Quantitative Geology and GeostatisticsA plea for an inductivist theory of knowledge is presumably not quite in tune with the fashion of the day. Nevertheless, contrary to the currently prevailing opinion that the case for induction is closed and beyond any hope, my claim is that induction is the only hope left if we want to avoid skepticism.