Titlebook: Allocation, Information and Markets; John Eatwell,Murray Milgate,Peter Newman Book 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publis

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Fraud, to choose a course of action he would not have chosen had he been properly informed. The essential element of this phenomenon is the presence of two individuals both of whom have something to gain from co-operating with each other but who have conflicting interests and differential information. Mor

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Hidden Actions, Moral Hazard and Contract Theory,s behaviour. As an extreme but standard example, a fire insurance holder may burn the property in order to obtain the insured sums. Although the expression can be found in earlier literature, its extensive use in economics can be dated from Arrow’s . (1971), which had a decisive influence in popular

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Incentive Compatibility, the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources or the equitable resolution of disputes. In many situations it is relatively easy to conceive of feasible processes; processes which will accomplish the goals if all participants follow the rules and are capable of handling the informational requirements

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Incomplete Contracts,nderstanding of the standard theory of perfect competition under complete markets, but more importantly to the resulting realization that this paradigm is insufficient to accommodate a number of important economic phenomena. Studying in more detail the process of contracting — particularly its hazar

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Market Failure,ve an equilibrium allocation of resources which is Pareto optimal. This characteristic of markets, which was loosely conjectured by Adam Smith, has received its clearest expression in the theorems of modern welfare economics. For our purposes, the first of these, named the First Fundamental Theorem

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2946-9805 ject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.978-0-333-49539-1978-1-349-20215-7Series ISSN 2946-9805 Series E-ISSN 2946-9813

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