Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 19th International C Jugal Garg,Max Klimm,Yuqing Kong Conference proceedings 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable)

Mechanics

Parameter

Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangementsevious hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be

Ancillary

Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangementsevious hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be

做事过头

Buy-Many Mechanisms for Many Unit-Demand Buyersm pricing mechanism with buyer-specific prices can achieve an . approximation to this revenue benchmark when all buyers have unit-demand or additive preferences over m items. This is the best possible as it directly matches the previous results for the single-buyer setting where no simple mechanism

incubus

欢腾

Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divd assumption of being able to afford each agent entirely, we are able to circumvent such results. We design a polynomial-time, deterministic, truthful, budget-feasible, .-approximation mechanism for the setting where each agent offers multiple levels of service and the auctioneer has a discrete sepa

杀人

Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divd assumption of being able to afford each agent entirely, we are able to circumvent such results. We design a polynomial-time, deterministic, truthful, budget-feasible, .-approximation mechanism for the setting where each agent offers multiple levels of service and the auctioneer has a discrete sepa

Coronary

Fair Division with Allocator’s Preferenceoth the agents’ and the allocator’s perspectives, in which such an allocation is called . or . respectively. When the allocator’s utility depends exclusively on the items (but not to whom an item is allocated), we prove that a doubly EF-1 allocation always exists. For the general setting where the a

他很灵活

Ambulatory

Fair Division with Allocator’s Preferenceoth the agents’ and the allocator’s perspectives, in which such an allocation is called . or . respectively. When the allocator’s utility depends exclusively on the items (but not to whom an item is allocated), we prove that a doubly EF-1 allocation always exists. For the general setting where the a