Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 10th International C Tie-Yan Liu,Qi Qi,Yinyu Ye Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International Publishing S

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洞穴

Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgetsselling identical goods at different prices. For this reason, Feldman et al. [7] dropped incentive compatibility and turned the attention to revenue maximizing envy-free item-pricing allocations for budgeted bidders. . allocations were suggested by classical papers [9,15]. The key property of such a

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Conference proceedings 2014ld in Beijing, China, in December 2014. The 32 regular and 13 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 107 submissions and cover results on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.

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Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibriar congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions.

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Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Gamesrix game is .-hard. Our main result is that an (0.5 + .)-Nash equilibrium of an .-player polymatrix game can be computed in time polynomial in the input size and .. Inspired by the algorithm of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [23], our algorithm uses gradient descent on the maximum regret of the players.

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Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgetsfor the bounded knapsack problem, given the well-known FPTAS, our results imply there is a provable gap between the optimization domain and the mechanism design domain. Finally, for procurement games with ., we construct a universally truthful budget-feasible mechanism that gives an .-approximation in polynomial time with a demand oracle.

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