找回密码
 To register

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 10th International C Tie-Yan Liu,Qi Qi,Yinyu Ye Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International Publishing S

[复制链接]
楼主: 法令
发表于 2025-3-26 21:23:23 | 显示全部楼层
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matchingces even though they have an edge available..As our main result, we introduce an algorithm which randomly discards some edges of the graph in a particular manner – thus enabling the necessary skipping of vertices – and simultaneously runs the color-oblivious algorithm .. We prove that this algorithm
发表于 2025-3-27 02:51:30 | 显示全部楼层
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgetsm that returns an (1 − .)-approximation of the revenue obtained by any envy-free fixed-price mechanism for any . > 0 and runs in polynomial time in the number of bidders . and 1/ . even for exponential supply of goods .. Next, we consider the case of budgeted bidders with matching-type preferences o
发表于 2025-3-27 07:51:31 | 显示全部楼层
Argyrios Deligkas,John Fearnley,Rahul Savani,Paul Spirakis
发表于 2025-3-27 09:44:20 | 显示全部楼层
Smriti Bhagat,Anthony Kim,S. Muthukrishnan,Udi Weinsberg
发表于 2025-3-27 14:39:11 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 21:51:33 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 23:17:46 | 显示全部楼层
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria-increasing utility functions..We show that the value of the potential function Φ(.) of any outcome . of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value Φ(..) by a factor . which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions ., and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the t
发表于 2025-3-28 05:20:19 | 显示全部楼层
Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities the item. The goal of the seller is to maximize his revenue. Previous work on this problem [7] studies the case where clients are offered the item in sequence and have to pay personalized prices. This is highly infeasible in large scale networks such as the Facebook graph: (1) Offering items to the
发表于 2025-3-28 08:25:01 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-28 14:30:55 | 显示全部楼层
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Gamesy (PoA). First, we prove that among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case PoA. Second, if the guaranteed existence condition is dropped, then the proportional cost-sharing method minimizes the worst-case PoA over all
 关于派博传思  派博传思旗下网站  友情链接
派博传思介绍 公司地理位置 论文服务流程 影响因子官网 SITEMAP 大讲堂 北京大学 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
发展历史沿革 期刊点评 投稿经验总结 SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系数 清华大学 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋| 派博传思国际 ( 京公网安备110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-6-29 11:54
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博传思   京公网安备110108008328 版权所有 All rights reserved
快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表