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Titlebook: Understanding Auctions; Asunción Mochón,Yago Sáez Textbook 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 Auction Mechanism.Aucti

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Standard Single-Unit Auctions,ection is devoted to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that, under certain assumptions, the four auction formats yield the same expected revenue to the seller. The implications of relaxing each assumption are also shown.
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Combinatorial Auction Models,d (single-round), pricing rule, activity rule, and starting price. Given the wide spectrum of possibilities, in this chapter, we will only focus on analyzing a few of these models in which the first-price rule will be applied.
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Assigning Multiple Homogeneous Items in a Single Auction,. For example, if an olive oil factory wants to sell part of its stock, it can choose to conduct an auction. The items to be auctioned may be homogeneous (oil bottles of the same size and acidity) or heterogeneous (different sizes and acidities) and may be awarded in a single auction or in different
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