| 书目名称 | Strategic Voting | | 编辑 | Reshef Meir | | 视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/879/878837/878837.mp4 | | 丛书名称 | Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning | | 图书封面 |  | | 描述 | .Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting...There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome.In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science...The book has two parts. The first part asks "are there voting rules that are truthful?" in the sense that all voters have an incentive toreport their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point,we survey both extensions of the theorem and v | | 出版日期 | Book 2018 | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01579-3 | | isbn_softcover | 978-3-031-00451-3 | | isbn_ebook | 978-3-031-01579-3Series ISSN 1939-4608 Series E-ISSN 1939-4616 | | issn_series | 1939-4608 | | copyright | Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 |
The information of publication is updating
|
|
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋|
派博传思国际
( 京公网安备110108008328)
GMT+8, 2025-8-1 04:56
发表于 2025-3-21 18:41:27
