Titlebook: Spies of the Kaiser; German Covert Operat Thomas Boghardt Book 2004 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2004 bib

Magnanimous

书目名称Spies of the Kaiser影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser影响因子(影响力)学科排名




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser网络公开度




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser被引频次




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser被引频次学科排名




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser年度引用




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser年度引用学科排名




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser读者反馈




书目名称Spies of the Kaiser读者反馈学科排名

MITE

Conclusion, would be tempting to attribute the failure of German espionage to British countermeasures. However, the incapability of both the German and the British intelligence communities to fulfil their respective tasks was due far more to inherent deficiencies than to the activities of an enemy service.

Obscure

CARK

2633-5964 m shaped the British intelligence community in the early Twentieth-century. The study is based on original archival material, including hitherto unexploited German records and recently declassified British documents.978-1-349-51611-7978-0-230-50842-2Series ISSN 2633-5964 Series E-ISSN 2633-5972

insurrection

The Origins of British Counter-Espionage,foreshadowed plainly enough to open our eyes, if we had not been wilfully blind’.. His message was straightforward. A false sense of security and lack of preparedness had caused British failure. The story, subsequently reprinted in more accessible book form, adopted the moral imperative of shaking the British people from national indolence..

连累

deciduous

记忆

The Origins of German Naval Intelligence, one hand, many Germans, especially amongst the middle classes, regarded a strong navy as a necessary precondition for the successful conduct of . The popular contemporary equation of naval might with global power was strongly reinforced by the writings of Alfred T. Mahan, especially his . first pub

incite

bleach

German Pre-War Espionage in Great Britain, intelligence on the opponent (.) so as to enable the Admiralstab to make appropriate preparations for the event of war’.. However, until 1911 it was far from clear for German naval planners which navy would be their most likely opponent. Chancellor Bismarck, who was in office until 1890, viewed Bri