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Titlebook: Seemings and Epistemic Justification; How Appearances Just Luca Moretti Book 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature

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发表于 2025-3-21 17:27:36 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
书目名称Seemings and Epistemic Justification
副标题How Appearances Just
编辑Luca Moretti
视频video
概述Focuses on phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising conceptions of epistemic justification.Sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by rejecting apparently consolidated obj
丛书名称SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
图书封面Titlebook: Seemings and Epistemic Justification; How Appearances Just Luca Moretti Book 2020 The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
描述.This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. .According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices..This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited t
出版日期Book 2020
关键词Phenomenal Conservatism; Phenomenal Dogmatism; Non-Inferential Justification; Perceptual Justification;
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5
isbn_softcover978-3-030-43391-8
isbn_ebook978-3-030-43392-5Series ISSN 2211-4548 Series E-ISSN 2211-4556
issn_series 2211-4548
copyrightThe Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
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发表于 2025-3-21 21:41:41 | 显示全部楼层
Concluding Remarks,t that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.
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The Bayesian Objection,e with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-bas
发表于 2025-3-22 14:32:50 | 显示全部楼层
Antiscepticism and Easy Justification,can lose it simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflic
发表于 2025-3-22 19:23:53 | 显示全部楼层
Concluding Remarks,y serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if
发表于 2025-3-22 22:35:31 | 显示全部楼层
2211-4548 omenal conservatism by rejecting apparently consolidated obj.This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the
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