书目名称 | Seemings and Epistemic Justification |
副标题 | How Appearances Just |
编辑 | Luca Moretti |
视频video | |
概述 | Focuses on phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising conceptions of epistemic justification.Sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by rejecting apparently consolidated obj |
丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Philosophy |
图书封面 |  |
描述 | .This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. .According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices..This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited t |
出版日期 | Book 2020 |
关键词 | Phenomenal Conservatism; Phenomenal Dogmatism; Non-Inferential Justification; Perceptual Justification; |
版次 | 1 |
doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5 |
isbn_softcover | 978-3-030-43391-8 |
isbn_ebook | 978-3-030-43392-5Series ISSN 2211-4548 Series E-ISSN 2211-4556 |
issn_series | 2211-4548 |
copyright | The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 |