Titlebook: Saul Kripke on Modal Logic; Yale Weiss,Romina Birman Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to

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,Logics for Rigidity,onclusion is supported by the idea that proper names and natural kinds terms are rigid designators. To explore the cogency of Kripke’s position, this paper takes on two interlocking projects in the formulation of the semantics for quantified modal logic (QML). Project 1. Define ‘rigidity’ in a way t

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,A Letter from Kripke to Lewis,fied Modal Logic” (Lewis, .). The original letter was typeset by Mimi Foster (indicated by the initials “mf” at the end of the letter) at Rockefeller University. In consultation with Saul Kripke, we corrected some typos, filled in blank formulas, and added three footnotes. Keywords have been added b

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,Individual Concepts: Their Logic, Philosophy, and Some of Their Uses,blished as  Kripke, .). It contains philosophical reflections and technical results concerning “Carnapian” quantified modal logic, that is, modal logic with quantification over individual concepts. The paper contains the fullest statement by the author available of (un)axiomatizability results he ob

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A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Formal Epistemology, These characterizations have been challenged by Gettier counterexamples and their variants. A modern proposal, what is known as defeasibility theory, characterizes knowledge through stability under revision of beliefs on the basis of true or arbitrary information. A formal investigation of such a p

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,New(ish) Foundations for Theories of Entailment,relevant normal modal logics and the properties of entailment, as defined as necessitated relevant implication, in these systems. Fine-Urquhart style semantics are provided for these relevant modal logics and proofs of soundness and completeness are given. The semantics is used to prove admissibilit

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The Logic of Logical Necessity, it to the logical interpretation of modality and some views in modal metaphysics. In particular, we present an hitherto unpublished solution to problems 41 and 42 from Friedman’s 102 problems, which uses a different method of proof from the solution presented in the paper of Tadeusz Prucnal.