Titlebook: Networks and Groups; Models of Strategic Bhaskar Dutta,Matthew O. Jackson Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Coalitions.Desi

有恶意

Network Formation With Sequential Demands,f division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands.

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Indebted

A strategic analysis of network reliability,ks and efficient networks..We find that if the society is large, and link formation costs are moderate, Nash networks as well as efficient networks will be ‘super-connected’, i.e. every link is redundant in the sense that the network remains connected even after the link is deleted. This contrasts w

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A Dynamic Model of Network Formation,network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the

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CANDY

Valves

,Buyers’ and Sellers’ Cartels on Markets With Indivisible Goods,model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal size

黄瓜

Venules

Book 2003and groups, we were happy to accept because of the growing research on this important topic. We were also pleasantly surprised at the response to our request for submissions to the special issue, receiving a much larger number of sub­ missions than we had anticipated. In the end we were able to put

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