Titlebook: Kinins V; Keishi Abe,Hiroshi Moriya,Setsuro Fujii Book 1989 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Sp

Oration

Osamu Iimura,Kazuaki Shimamotot only computer algorithms. Social algorithms remain largely unanalyzed except in special subfields like social choice theory or fair division [5]. These fields do not tend to analyze complex social algorithms as is done in computer science. This paper illustrates the different ingredients that make

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Keishi Abehe effects of lying in public discourse. Next, we turn to the study of lying in games. First, a game-theoretical analysis is used to explain how the possibility of lying makes games such as Liar’s Dice interesting, and how lying is put to use in optimal strategies for playing the game. This is the o

corpus-callosum

Takao Sarutaphenomena such as procrastination, addiction and in general inconsistency over time. This chapter investigates whether forms of non-exponential discounting, in particular close to the so called Quasi-Hyperbolic model, could also be characterized in terms of dynamically consistent choices when indivi

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Lee Chao,Ying-Peng Chen,Cheryl Woodley-Miller,Lingyuan Li,Kay von Harten,Julie Chaoorgenstern finally produced a difficult bulky book ., whose academic reaction was initially rather quiet, requiring many years for its full recognition by social and natural scientists. It is of utmost importance to draw a definite line between “games under risk,” represented by . in Doyle’s detecti

Longitude

John M. Stewart,Raymond J. Vavrekorgenstern finally produced a difficult bulky book ., whose academic reaction was initially rather quiet, requiring many years for its full recognition by social and natural scientists. It is of utmost importance to draw a definite line between “games under risk,” represented by . in Doyle’s detecti

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isputes. Despite the rich theoretical literature on crisis bargaining and widespread concerns over various sources of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, early stage disputes have not been fully modeled. We theorize them in a framework in which countries do not seek immediate redistribution of good

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Harry S. Margoliusrst, we discuss international trade negotiations and agricultural reforms. With respect to agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the following points were agreed upon: (1) the tariffication of nontariff barriers and, (2) the restraint of price-supporting policies and the promotion of direc

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S. Nakanishi,N. Kitamura,H. Ohkubo,A. Kakizuka,R. Kageyama,Y. Masu,K. Nakayamaices. Such a coordination failure is serious in the realm of developmental finance, where major states vie against one another in extending loan contracts to developing states through separate institutions. Competitive lending is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it may satisfy strong credit de