Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; Second International Paul Spirakis,Marios Mavronicolas,Spyros Kontogian Conference proceedings 2006 Springe

ICLE

Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit,ny knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any .∈. . and .>0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of ., where . is the maximum social utility of the auction.

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Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain,g . mechanisms with verification that optimally solve the underlying optimization problem. Problems (optimally) solved with our technique belong to a rich class that includes, as special cases, . problems and many others considered in literature for so called . agents (e.g., the make-span). Our tech

omnibus

Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games,Nash equilibria. It is known, however, that there exist pure equilibria for both of these variants in the case of ., i. e., if the players’ strategy spaces contain only sets of cardinality one. In this paper, we investigate how far such a property on the players’ strategy spaces guaranteeing the exi

NAVEN

On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games,o route one unit of flow on a path from her origin to her destination at minimum cost, and the cost of using an arc only depends on the total number of players using that arc. A natural extension is to allow for players sending different amounts of flow, which results in so-called weighted congestio

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The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games,dentical players, in which the strategy set of each player is the collection of all paths in a given network that link the player’s origin and destination vertices, and congestion increases the costs of edges. A network congestion game in which the players differ only in their origin–destination pai

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First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction,ith random edge costs. These statistics attempt to describe two seemingly unrelated phenomena, arising in physics and economics respectively: the first-passage percolation time predicts how long it takes for a fluid to spread through a random medium, while the VCG payment for the shortest path is th

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Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems, this mechanism also achieves an .(log. .)-approximation of the social cost, where . is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all .(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions. W

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