Titlebook: Information Security and Cryptology -- ICISC 2012; 15th International C Taekyoung Kwon,Mun-Kyu Lee,Daesung Kwon Conference proceedings 2013

破译密码

Cleave

Quantitative Questions on Attack–Defense Treesthat can be used for quantitative analysis of attack–defense scenarios. In practice, we use intuitive questions to ask about aspects of scenarios we are interested in. Formally, a computational procedure, using a bottom-up algorithm, is applied to derive the corresponding numerical values. This pape

直言不讳

DNS Tunneling for Network PenetrationBecause of the limited, supposedly safe functionality of the Domain Name System protocol, its traffic is by and large neglected by firewalls. The resulting possibility for setting up information channels through DNS tunnels is already known, but all existing implementations require help from insider

GUILE

Ruptured-Disk

iBinHunt: Binary Hunting with Inter-procedural Control Flowow, and in particular, intra-procedural control flow, has become an attractive technique in the latest binary diffing tools since it is more resistant to syntactic, but non-semantic, differences. However, this makes such techniques vulnerable to simple function obfuscation techniques (e.g., function

无弹性

Sometimes It’s Better to Be STUCK! SAML Transportation Unit for Cryptographic Keyssubjects. Most notably, SAML facilitates the . of users, and is thus deployed in both Webservice (SOAP, WS-Security) and REST-based (SAML SSO webbrowser profile, SAML Bearer token in OAuth) services..This paper recommends an extension to the SAML framework which provides an easy way to transport cry

FICE

无可争辩

慷慨不好

Comprehensive Study of Integral Analysis on 22-Round LBlockck uses the same 15-round integral distinguisher as the previous attacks, but many techniques are taken into consideration in order to achieve comprehensive understanding of the attack; choosing the best balanced-byte position, meet-in-the-middle technique to identify right key candidates, partial-s

garrulous

New Impossible Differential Attack on SAFER +  and SAFER + +ns of SAFER+ for security. The numbers of rounds for SAFER+ with key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 are 8, 12 and 16, respectively. SAFER++, a variant of SAFER+, was among the cryptographic primitives selected for the second phase of the NESSIE project. The block size is 128 bits and the key size can tak