Titlebook: Information Dissemination in Currency Crises; Christina E. Metz Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Coordination Games.Curren

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Game-Theoretic Preliminaries,re conscious that their actions affect each other” (Rasmusen, 1995). Game theory is therefore suitable as a modelling tool for a large number of economic problems, among them decision problems on financial markets. In the following, let us characterize and explain the most basic game-theoretic terms

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Transparency and Expectation Formation in the Basic Morris/Shin-Model (1998),ty. What matters is not the amount of information about the economic funda-mentals per se, but rather whether this information is common knowledge or not. This idea is not quite intuitive. Let us therefore consider the following argument: in the Morris/Shin-model with noisy information, it will neve

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Introduction,As such, it is possible to give policy advice to the government or central bank on how to possibly prevent the occurrence of currency crises in the future. In this respect, one of the most urgent questions to be answered refers to the optimal use of information. The importance of informational aspec

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Currency Crisis Models With Small And Large Traders,titu-tions (HLIs) have strongly increased. Many analysts as well as policy makers have expressed their concerns that large players may have a disproportionate effect on markets and as such may trigger crises that are not fully justified by fundamentals, hence threatening the stability of the whole f