Titlebook: In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy; Critical Encounters Matthew H. Kramer Book 1999 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Pub

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,Of Aristotle and Ice Cream Cones: Reflections on Jules Coleman’s Theory of Corrective justice,ere has been a good deal of overlapping and repetition among those writings, there have also occurred some major shifts in Coleman’s positions. One of the aims of the present essay is to determine whether the transformations in Coleman’s thinking have been entirely salutary.

兴奋过度

,Getting the Rabbit Out of the Hat: A Critique of Anthony Kronman’s Theory of Contract,hilosophy of private law’.. Kronman’s article has received a great deal of attention on both sides of the Atlantic, and it has helped to sharpen the debate between libertarianism and other forms of liberalism. In the present essay, we shall seek to expose two major weaknesses in Kronman’s arguments (after we briefly summarize his reasoning).

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Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1999

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Introduction,s on the topics addressed by those arguments. Hence, notwithstanding that this book consists chiefly of critical encounters with contemporary legal and moral philosophy, most of the criticism is meant to be constructive in the sense that it leads to the staking out of alternative positions on the relevant issues.

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What Good is Truth?, position. Skeptics therefore exclude themselves from participating genuinely in a debate over truth’s value. Although their self-disqualification never . establishes the goodness of knowledge, it ‘should persuade the sceptic to cut short idle doubting’ (NLNR, 75; ‘Scepticism’, 267). Or so Finnis believes.

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Justice as Constancy,s largely a critique of a brilliant essay by David Lyons, will aim to highlight the unwisdom of approaches to the law—morality relation that generalize too sweepingly over the divide between substance and procedure.

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,Reason Without Reasons: A Critique of Alan Gewirth’s Moral Philosophy, is binding on everyone to whom it could possibly be addressed. (One should readily notice some resemblances between this effort by Gewirth to ground morality and the effort by Finnis to refute skepticism, which was studied in Essay 1.)