Titlebook: Imagined Causes: Hume‘s Conception of Objects; Stefanie Rocknak Book 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Conception of Obj

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Elementary Belief, Causally-Produced Belief and the Natural Relation of Causality.3.6 he uses the word ‘object,’ or ‘objects’ or alternatively, ‘bodies’ at least 38 times. As a result, his account of cause and effect and belief cannot be exhaustively explained until we carefully develop Hume’s thoughts on objects. However, to even . our discussion of objects, we need to have at

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The Two Systems of Realityvacious ideas in the manner that causation can (T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107). But the implications of Hume’s account of reality are far-reaching. In fact, if we don’t take his two systems of reality into account, we can’t understand his notion of an object, his many forms of belief, nor his notion of justifi

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gusher

The First Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity: The Foundation of Secret Causesthat admit of perfect identity, must, according to Hume, be .. In this chapter, we examine Hume’s somewhat implicit first account of perfect identity, given in 1.3.2. In the course of doing so, we begin to see how and why proto-objects enable us to imagine objects that admit of a perfect identity. H

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A Mysterious Kind of Causation: The Second Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity that concerns the “philosophical” conception of objects. I argue that there is a . position: ., which includes two more accounts of how we transcendentally conceive of perfect identity. We examine one of those accounts of perfect identity here (which constitutes Hume’s . account of how we transcend

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Unity, Number and Time: The Third Account of Transcendental Perfect Identityn of this system is lacking in the literature, although Kemp Smith (1941), does parse it into respective parts, and gives a brief explanation of it . a four part system (pp. 474–487). However, in the next few chapters I give a much more exhaustive account.

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The Vulgar Attempt to Achieve Perfect Identity . sections, which correspond to, respectively, parts 2 and 3 of Hume’s system of identity. We may refer to these sections as vulgar perspective I, and vulgar perspective II. Second, neither vulgar perspective I nor II should be confused with the three accounts of perfect identity that were explicat

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Personal Identitythis claim in 1.4.6—at least in part. This occurs during his admittedly “labyrinth[ine]” (T App. 10; SBN 633) explanation of . we imagine the notion of the self, an explanation that he famously attacks just 2 years after the publication of the . in the . (T App. 10–22; SBN 633–6). Here, I show that

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