Titlebook: Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems; Theory and Implicati Markus Berndt Book 2002 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesba

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Analytical Framework,ion between the party (the agents) that takes some action on behalf of outsiders (principals), combined with the fact that results are not perfectly correlated with efforts of the insiders. Depending on the timing of contracting, action of the agent, and random influences of nature, one distinguishes between . or . and ., as well as ..

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Patrick Bartels,Michael H. Breitnertervention is endogenized. It is assumed that a public-regarding legislator takes the corporate governance systems of firms as given and sets the law accordingly. As will be shown, this behavior increases the stability of the resulting financial systems.

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Concentrated Control - the Insider System, for the foregone private benefits that come with the sale. This compensation takes the form of a voting premium that is paid when acquiring control blocks. Empirical research has quantified this premium to range from 5.4% in the US to 82% in Italy. An overview of these empirical finding is given by Macey (1998, p. 910).

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20948-4 of capital, as proven by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their seminal paper, however, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the separation of ownership and control that is associated with corporate finance produces agency costs. Classical agency costs arise from asymmetric distribution of informat

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