Titlebook: Games to Play and Games not to Play; Strategic Decisions Uri Weiss,Joseph Agassi Book 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)

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Verwendung als Entscheidungsmodell,is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success.AQ1These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated p

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-90181-1ation in the shadow of the sword, i.e. a negotiation in which each side knows that if the parties do not achieve an agreement, the alternative may be a war, and thus the bargaining position of its party is function of their capacities in a case of war. Negotiation in the shadow of international law

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Analyse stochastischer Schwingungssysteme,en the USSR and US as a super-game in which every country can refuse playing the (repeat) game of chicken. We will discuss some subsets of the chicken game: the simultaneous one versus the sequential one, one with free information and one without free information, one with an option of communication

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-93374-5cal equilibrium is different. It occurs when no player sees incentives to change strategy unilaterally. A game may be in Nash equilibrium and not in game-theoretical equilibrium due to mistaken judgment. The advantage of Nash equilibrium over game-theoretical one is obvious. The advantage of game-th

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58784-9 games but also what game to play. We propose different new equilibria of super-games that comprise choices of plans for what games to play and for how to play them.  Nash theory allows for equilibria for games and for achieving inefficient equilibria in some games. Similarly, the theory should allo