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Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

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书目名称Games in Management Science
副标题Essays in Honor of G
编辑Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi
视频video
概述Highlights the latest treatment of emerging and revisited problems in management science that honors the scientific achievements of Professor Georges Zaccour.Examines a wide variety of game theory app
丛书名称International Series in Operations Research & Management Science
图书封面Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
描述This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements..
出版日期Book 2020
关键词Management Science; Game Theory; Georges Zaccour; Health Care Management; Environmental Management; Suppl
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8
isbn_softcover978-3-030-19109-2
isbn_ebook978-3-030-19107-8Series ISSN 0884-8289 Series E-ISSN 2214-7934
issn_series 0884-8289
copyrightSpringer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
The information of publication is updating

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The Effects of Consumer Rebates in a Competitive Distribution Channel,acturer, two-retailer channel and develop a two-period model where consumers’ preferences are distributed along a Hotelling line. The rebate consists in a price discount that can be redeemed on the second period. We solve three Stackelberg games: a benchmark where no rebate is offered, a symmetric g
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On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising,cally integrated firms, whenever this is efficient for firms. This is particularly relevant when the vertical externality provokes distortions in the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D or advertising. The present model illustrates the possibility of using two-part tariffs endogenously defined as lin
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Product Recalls and Channel Pricing, strategies in marketing channels. By doing so, we analyze whether vendor agreements between manufacturers and retailers, which are signed before any unit is sold, could distort channel profits by aggravating double marginalization. We characterize the equilibrium pricing strategies in closed form f
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Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Price-Dependent Returns,e selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively
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A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime, a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where . coalitions exist and behave as . players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperati
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Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition,dying how environmental emissions and tax payments alter the incentives business owners have to divert their managers from profit maximization in favor of sales revenue generation. Two scenarios are compared depending on whether the upstream supplier precommits to a fixed input price or adopts a fle
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