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Titlebook: Game Theory for Cyber Deception; From Theory to Appli Jeffrey Pawlick,Quanyan Zhu Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Game Theory

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发表于 2025-3-21 18:33:37 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
书目名称Game Theory for Cyber Deception
副标题From Theory to Appli
编辑Jeffrey Pawlick,Quanyan Zhu
视频video
概述Introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, analyze, and model cyber deception.Develops a thorough game-theoretic taxonomy to identify and investigate emerging problems in cybersecurity.Includ
丛书名称Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
图书封面Titlebook: Game Theory for Cyber Deception; From Theory to Appli Jeffrey Pawlick,Quanyan Zhu Book 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Game Theory
描述.This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field..The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying abilities to
出版日期Book 2021
关键词Game Theory cyber deception; Game theory cybersecurity; Game Theory Internet of Things; Defensive decep
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66065-9
isbn_softcover978-3-030-66067-3
isbn_ebook978-3-030-66065-9Series ISSN 2363-8516 Series E-ISSN 2363-8524
issn_series 2363-8516
copyrightSpringer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
The information of publication is updating

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Nash and Stackelberg Games matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equil
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Obfuscationation tracking algorithms, or evade government surveillance. These techniques raise two conflicts: one between each user and the machine learning algorithms which track the users, and one between the users themselves.
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Honey-X a species of crypsis (Sect. .). But in other species of deception, the defender aims to create a specific false belief. This is called mimesis. The present chapter studies static mimesis, or, ., which takes its name from technologies related to honeypots, honeytokens, etc.
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Attacker Engagementorked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. If these active defenses are also dynamic, then we have the species of deception that Chap. . calls ..
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Active Crowd Defensethe “physical bandwidth” of a cyber-physical system. In order to model active defense used against a PDoS attack, we develop a “Poisson signaling game,” a signaling game with an unknown number of receivers, which have varying abilities to detect deception. Equilibrium results indicate that (1) defen
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Insights and Future Directionssons learned during its completion. These insights are situated within the current state of cybersecurity research, and more importantly, within current societal challenges. Second, we outline an ambitious range of future research which could be carried out using this book as a foundation.
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Current Challenges in Cyber Deceptionon that are found more broadly in the existing literature. As a point of reference, we refer to the research works mentioned in Chap. .. The literature discussed in Chap. . points towards four major challenges in cyber deception.
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