Titlebook: Game Theory; Stochastics, Informa Joachim Rosenmüller Book 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000 bargaining.economics.game th

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-91773-8 with market games, more precisely TU-market games or side payment market games. The convergence or “equivalence” of core and equilibrium is perhaps not so much a topic of game theory but rather of general equilibrium theory, there is an ample supply of literature on this field, see . [HDB74], . [MC

ARBOR

venous-leak

Allgemeine EnergiewirtschaftslehreThe topic of large games has been dealt with in the previous chapters by means of a replication procedure. This means that games or markets increase by replicating a fixed number of types of players and by considering the limiting behavior of solution concepts like the core, the Shapley value, or the Walrasian equilibrium.

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轻而薄

978-1-4419-5114-4Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Mirage

Game Theory978-1-4757-3212-2Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044

Critical

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3212-2bargaining; economics; game theory; incomplete information; mathematical economics; strategy

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情感

Book 2000mes withperfect information) on one hand and the coalitional function (simplegames, convex games, superadditive games, the core, the Shapleyvolume) on the other hand. .Some emphasis is laid on the probabilistic background; however, theauthor treats stochastic games using the language of probability

虚弱的神经

Folk Theorems,h equilibria may exist. They may be of different nature, lacking symmetry or providing symmetric and non symmetric solutions. There may be Nash equilibria which are not Pareto efficient and no other ones. This frequently leads to the effect that players are locked in a non efficient equilibrium.