Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 2015Latest edition Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2015 Applic

morale

Exkurs: Das Rechnungswesen der Unternehmunga Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if the game is repeated a finite number of times, cf. Problem 4.10. As we will see in this chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is coming at a price, namely the existen

concise

PLAYS

Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehrese coalitions. A cooperative game is more abstract than a noncooperative game in the sense that strategies are not explicitly modelled: rather, the game describes what each possible coalition can earn by cooperation. In a cooperative game with . it is assumed that the earnings of a coalition can be

结合

Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehretegic possibilities of a player; instead, a detailed description of what players and coalitions can attain in terms of outcomes or utilities; solution concepts based on strategic considerations and/or considerations of fairness, equity, efficiency, etc.; if possible, an axiomatic characterization of

冲突

hematuria

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-00213-0e moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps. . and 5, and also occur in Chaps. . and 7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps. . and 5, and it may be useful to (re)read these chapters before continuing.

使高兴

Hans PetersTeaches the basics of game theory on a thorough level.Adapted for the needs of both undergraduate and graduate students.Covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory

Awning

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7Applications of game theory; Bargaining; Cooperative games; Duality; Equilibrium; Game theory; Nash equili

Collected

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-94599-0trast to . it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes discussed in Sect. .

inscribe

Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehree-shot’: players move sequentially, and one and the same player may move more often than once. Such games are best described by drawing a decision tree which tells us whose move it is and what a player’s information is when that player has to make a move.