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Titlebook: Game Theory; An Introduction with Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Muñoz-Garcia Textbook 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s),

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Ana Espinola-Arredondo,Felix Muñoz-GarciaProvides step-by-step "tools" or "recipes" to help readers solve different classes of games.Focuses on the application of solution concepts to different settings in economics, business, and more.Suppl
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Extranasale Allergien und Pseudoallergien,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.
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Juha Punnonen MD, PhD,Jan E. de Vries PhDIn this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.
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Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium,In previous chapters, we considered games that had at least one NE, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Battle of the Sexes, and the Chicken games. But, do all games have at least one NE? If we restrict players to choose a specific strategy with certainty, some games may not have an NE.
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,In this chapter, we extend the incomplete information games studied in Chapter 8 to allow for sequential interaction. We also extend the sequential-move games of Chapter 6 to allow for incomplete information, that is, at least one of the players observes some information that her rivals do not observe.
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Cheap Talk Games,In this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider ., often known as “cheap talk.
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