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Front Matter |
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Abstract
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| 2 |
,Some Tips Concerning Application of Game Theory to Real Problems, |
Michael Maschler |
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Abstract
Let me start by saying that this note is not intended to be a survey, nor will I consider descriptive applications of game theory. The reader can find a lot of information about these topics in Aumann (1985) and in Aumann and Hart (1992 –). I shall concentrate on normal applications of game theory. More precisely, I shall deal with the issue of: how game theory can help people in pursuing their goals. I shall mainly deal with the pitfalls and how to guard against them I experienced in my brief encounters with such issues.
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| 3 |
,Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design, |
Alvin E. Roth |
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Abstract
Markets evolve, but they are also designed. Entrepreneurs and managers, legislators and regulators, lawyers and judges, all get involved, at least indirectly, in market design. Recently game theorists have also started to take a direct role in design. This is a natural development, because game theory is the part of economics that deals with the “rules of the game” that define market operations.
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| 4 |
,On the Exploitation of Casino Games: How to Distinguish between Games of Chance and Games of Skill? |
Peter Borm,Ben Van Der Genugten |
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Abstract
In various countries, including the Netherlands and Austria, legislation is such that the question whether a specific game should be considered as a game of chance or as a game of skill is predominant in the exploitation decision of private casinos. This paper aims for an objective and operational criterium to quantify the relative level of skill with respect to chance of games in order to provide a juridical tool for classification. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games. The various concepts are illustrated by means of a variation of Poker.
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,Agreement through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case, |
Steven J. Brams,Jeffrey M. Togman |
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Abstract
After briefly recounting the centuries-old dispute between Great Britain and Ireland, the current conflict over Northern Ireland between Britain and Sinn Féin/Irish Republican Army (IRA) is analyzed as a 2 × 2 game. The unique Nash equilibrium in this game is shown not to predict the recent behavior of and Sinn Féin/IRA, which declared a cease-fire in September 1994, resumed its bombing campaign in February 1996, and reinstituted a cease-fire in July 1997. However, these moves are consistent with and Sinn Féin/IRAs asserting its threat power, according to the theory of moves (TOM)..The mutually beneficial resolution of this conflict seems to lie in the farsighted strategic calculations of leaders who, recognizing that a reversion to conflict is likely to occur if conciliatory behavior is not reciprocated, reward such behavior — even if it proves costly. The effective use of threat power in the 2 × 2 game indicates a possible path toward a resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. An appendix explores the relationship between this game and the well-known games of Chicken and Prisoners’ Dilemma, based on both standard game theory and TOM.
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,The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction, |
Eric Van Damme |
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Abstract
In February 1998 the Dutch government auctioned licences to operate mobile telecommunications networks according to the DCS-1800 technology. Two “national” licences and sixteen “regional” ones were auctioned by using a variant of the simultaneous, multiple round auction that was proposed by US-economists and that had been tested in the US. This paper describes how the decision to auction came about, it details the auction rules, and it analyzes the resulting outcomes.
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,Bird’s Tree Allocations Revisited, |
Vincent Feltkamp,Stef Tijs,Shigeo Muto |
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Abstract
Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) construction and cost allocation problems have been studied extensively in the literature, though usually not together. Bird (1976) proposes an allocation rule of which Granot and Huberman (1981) prove that it lies in the core of the associated mcst game. We show that the problems of finding an mcst and allocating its cost can be integrated. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the set of all Bird’s tree allocations using consistency, converse consistency, non-emptyness and efficiency, and give a strategic form game of which the set of Nash equilibria contains Bird’s tree allocations.
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,How to Share Railways Infrastructure Costs?, |
Vito Fragnelli,Ignacio García-Jurado,Henk Norde,Fioravante Patrone,Stef Tijs |
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Abstract
In this paper we propose an infrastructure access tariff in a cost allocation problem arising from the reorganization of the railway sector in Europe. To that aim we introduce the class of infrastructure cost games. A game in this class is a sum of airport games and what we call maintenance cost games, and models the infrastructure costs (building and maintenance) produced when a set of different types of trains belonging to several agents makes use of a certain infrastructure. We study some properties of infrastructure cost games and provide a formula for the Shapley value of a game in this class. The access tariff we propose is based on the Shapley value of infrastructure cost games.
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,Why Punish? Norms and Revenge in an Experimental Game, |
Uri Gneezy,Avraham Stoler |
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Abstract
People punish others for “unfair behavior” even when it is costly for them to do so. In the experiment, the effects of revenge and education were isolated as motives for punishment. Significantly less punishment was observed when either of the two motives was eliminated.
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,A Game-Theoretical Perspective for the Detection of Tacit Collusion, |
Michele Grillo |
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Abstract
This paper deals with two conceptually distinct, but connected, issues on the contribution of game-theoretical analysis to the detection of tacitly colluding behaviour in oligopoly. First, the need is emphasised to clearly distinguish between the notion of co-ordination and that of co-operation. Such a distinction puts a relevant constraint on the standard legal approach to collusion which misleadingly emphasises the former notion. Next, a critical review of the now growing literature on semicollusion suggests that sharper inference on collusive conduct should be drawn on the observation of the overall set of the firm’s long- and short-run decision variables.
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,Structural Estimation of Auction Models, |
Han Hong,Matthew Shum |
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Abstract
This paper surveys the existing literature on and considers a general methodological approach for the structural estimation of empirical auction models, in which the estimating equations are directly derived from the equilibrium bid functions posited in the theoretical literature. We describe the building blocks of an empirical structural auction model, and illustrate using the first-, second-, and ascending-auction models as examples. Alternative estimation approaches for these models are discussed.
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,A Multiplicative Variant of the Shapley Value for Factorizing the Risk of Disease, |
Matthias Land,Olaf Gefeller |
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Abstract
This article sets out to build the bridge between the mathematical philosophy of axiomatic approaches to cooperative game theory and practical concerns of statistical applications in epidemiology. It deals with the methodological task of appropriately assessing the impact of multiple characteristics of human behaviour, human constitution or environmental agents (the so called risk factors) on the disease load in the population. It is shown that this epidemiologic problem of multifactorial risk attribution can be formalized in a way that is comparable to the game-theoretic description of several players that act together in a grand coalition and are faced with the problem of dividing their profit fairly among them. In particular, epidemiologic methods of partitioning the risk of disease that are equivalent to the Shapley value are reviewed briefly. Moreover, a new parameter based on a multiplicative analogue of the Shapley value is introduced. Its application and the interpretation of its results are illustrated by epidemiologic data.
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,Experiments on Auctions with Random Prizes and EU/Non-EU Bidders, |
Lucia Parisio |
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Abstract
Recent developments in the theory of auctions with random prizes played by non-EU bidders provide a series of behavioral prescriptions which can be investigated with experimental methods. In this paper, we present results of an experiment involving a large number of participants, held at the Centre for Experimental Economics (University of York, UK). The test of the theory is conducted by means of auction (English and second price sealed bid) data coupled with some outside the auction evidence of bidders’ behavior towards risk. The latter evidence is obtained thanks to Neilson’s (1992) ”modified” version of the standard Becker et al. methodology. Experimental results indicate that bidders’ behaviour is sensitive to the environment which is used to solicit their certainty equivalent of lotteries. It is also found that individual violations of Expected Utility are smoothed down at the price level, since our experimental data confirms revenue equivalence.
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,Dynamic Games and Oligopoly Models of Technological Innovation, |
Maria Luisa Petit,Boleslaw Tolwinski |
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Abstract
Since innovation is clearly a dynamic phenomenon, the process of technological innovation should be analysed by making use of a dynamic approach. In this paper we present two different models of innovation in the framework of an oligopolistic market and show that differential (or difference) games can provide an appropriate analytical tool to analyse this kind of problems. In this context it is possible to introduce state variables representing the technological knowledge accumulated by the firms over time and to link the innovation process to those variables. Equilibria in Markov strategies are computed by using a modified policy iteration algorithm.
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,The Structure of Fair-Division Problems and the Design of Fair-Negotiation Procedures, |
Matthias G. Raith |
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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the structure of bilateral fair-division problems and show how it carries over to a wider spectrum of multi-issue negotiations. This provides insight into the extension of fair-division algorithms to more general fair-negotiation procedures. We develop a simple procedural tool that can be used to implement a variety of formal bargaining-theoretic solution concepts, where implementation here is supposed to mean the actual realization of a cooperative outcome in practice. An important feature is that the algorithm requires only little computational effort. Due to its tractability, it thus also provides the necessary argumentative support for a cooperative negotiation process.
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,Effectivity Functions and Parliamentary Governance Structures, |
Stefano Vannucci |
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Abstract
Several parliamentary governance structures based upon a directly elected premier are analyzed through their effectivity functions.lt is shown that only collegial governance structures which provide a tight connection between the premier and her prefixed majority enjoy strong stability.
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,Sequential Production Situations and Potentials, |
Mark Voorneveld,Stef Tijs,Lina Mallozzi |
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Abstract
This paper studies an important type of production problems in which production takes place in several stages. These problems are modeled as sequential production games, a specific class of extensive form games with imperfect information. These games are related to potential games. Despite the presence of imperfect information, it is shown that pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria do exist, thus allowing for easily adopt able recommendations to firms seeking the advice of game theorists.
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| 18 |
,Approximate Envy-Free Procedures, |
Dao-Zhi Zeng |
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Abstract
Consider a situation in which . players divide a cake. Each player has a preference expressed by a measure on the cake. Given a positive number ∈, a cake division is said to be ∈-envy-free, if every player measures his/her piece not smaller than the largest piece by ∈. This paper first forms an ∈-envy-free procedure for such an approximate envy-free division, based on a known idea of Brams and Taylor (1996), then presents another completely new procedure. The first procedure does not work for chore division but the second one works well. The number of necessary cuts of each procedure is bounded. Furthermore, the new procedure is generalized for ∈-multi-fair division. Finally, this paper gives procedures for ∈-envy-free division in unequal ratios.
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Back Matter |
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Abstract
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发表于 2025-3-21 16:57:30
