找回密码
 To register

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models IV; Social and Political Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Wirtschaftstheo

[复制链接]
楼主: 时间
发表于 2025-3-30 09:31:46 | 显示全部楼层
Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s
发表于 2025-3-30 14:47:01 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-30 17:33:04 | 显示全部楼层
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Partch the antagonistic parties are free to choose between offensive and defensive force structures given the DEH were true..First, it is assumed that both parties know each other’s intentions — expressed by the payoffs of the antagonists. Thereafter, it is assumed that one party knows about the other’s
发表于 2025-3-30 22:37:59 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-31 04:34:42 | 显示全部楼层
Covering Spaces and Fibrations,es including the status quo which results if none of the three proposals is accepted. It is an interesting fact that the set of uniformly perfect equilibrium points depends crucially on cardinal utilities although they always imply the same cyclical majorities. Furthermore, the staus quo will only s
 关于派博传思  派博传思旗下网站  友情链接
派博传思介绍 公司地理位置 论文服务流程 影响因子官网 SITEMAP 大讲堂 北京大学 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
发展历史沿革 期刊点评 投稿经验总结 SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系数 清华大学 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋| 派博传思国际 ( 京公网安备110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-5-25 23:11
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博传思   京公网安备110108008328 版权所有 All rights reserved
快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表