Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models III; Strategic Bargaining Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.W

INFER

书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III影响因子(影响力)




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III影响因子(影响力)学科排名




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III网络公开度




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III网络公开度学科排名




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III被引频次




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III被引频次学科排名




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III年度引用




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III年度引用学科排名




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III读者反馈




书目名称Game Equilibrium Models III读者反馈学科排名

Grievance

集合

Anatoliy K. Prykarpatsky,Ihor V. Mykytiukong players? We present a two-person repeated bargaining game in which players can negotiate for a long-term contract on their actions in the supergame model. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium point of our game necessarily leads to a Pareto efficient outcome if the equilibrium strategies fo

农学

Factual

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58095-6perative game-th oretic approach to analyze bargaining in a class of games . sidepayments in which a point from a Euclidean set of decision alternatives is to be selected in accordance with a simple collective decision rule (Laing, Nakabayashi, and Slotznick, 1983), such as any weighted or unweighte

Hirsutism

An Algebraic Specification Language,the apex player and any one of the minor players or else all of the minor players. The demand commitment model is a bargaining procedure, i.e. an extensive form game. This paper investigates the payoffs that result (as subgame perfect outcomes) for apex games when players use the demand commitment b

Hirsutism

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80278-1ision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences

持续

Mathematics and Its Applicationst. The object can be either of high value or of low value. Whereas the seller knows the real value, the buyer is not completely informed in that respect. With probability w he expects that the object is of low value and with the probability 1-w that it is of high value. The parameter w is common kno

缩短

FAST