找回密码
 To register

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models I; Evolution and Game D Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Spieltheorie.Wirtschaftsth

[复制链接]
楼主: 皱纹
发表于 2025-3-26 22:46:54 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 01:34:42 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 08:25:12 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 12:24:07 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-27 15:33:58 | 显示全部楼层
Evolutionary Stability and Dynamic Stability in a Class of Evolutionary Normal Form Games,ary stability and dynamic stability is illustrated by the fact that every ESS can be transformed into a non-ESS attractor by means of atransformation which leaves the dynamies essentially invariant..In all evolutionary normal form games, evolutionary stability of a fixed point implies dynamicstabili
发表于 2025-3-27 20:07:44 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-28 01:22:43 | 显示全部楼层
The Origin of Isogamous Sexual Differentiation,count of the inhomogeneous spatial structure of the gamete pool. Surprisingly, the refined models do not qualitatively affect the rather stringent conditions for the stable establishment of differentiated mating types. We have to conclude that a plausible scheme for the evolution of sexual different
发表于 2025-3-28 04:16:17 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-28 08:02:51 | 显示全部楼层
To trade, or not to trade; that is the question,th, which might even hamper the mating process. In addition, if male fish could participate in such a process, then male specialization might be more profitable than being an hermaphrodite..Instead of the preceding scenario, the hamlets egg trade under circumstances in which it is important to . tim
发表于 2025-3-28 11:21:38 | 显示全部楼层
 关于派博传思  派博传思旗下网站  友情链接
派博传思介绍 公司地理位置 论文服务流程 影响因子官网 SITEMAP 大讲堂 北京大学 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
发展历史沿革 期刊点评 投稿经验总结 SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系数 清华大学 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋| 派博传思国际 ( 京公网安备110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-5-20 05:03
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博传思   京公网安备110108008328 版权所有 All rights reserved
快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表