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Titlebook: Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value; Theory and Evidence Jennifer Carpenter,David Yermack Book 1999 Springer Science+Business Medi

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A better way to pay CEOs?he past 15 years or so. For example, the average CEO stock option grant (valued at Black-Scholes and in inflation adjusted 1994 dollars) increased from $155 thousand to $1.2 million between 1980 and 1994, representing an almost 700% increase. Moreover, for the largest publicly traded companies, stoc
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Dual agency: corporate boards with reciprocally interlocking relationships an employee of firm B sits on firm A’s board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where “at least one director... sat on t
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The rise and fall of executive share options in Britainy package. In marked contrast with developments in the USA, institutional investors have taken a leading role in conditioning the type of pay package that is possible for Britain’s top executives. This intervention can be seen as leading initially to an expansion in the use of executive share option
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