| 书目名称 | Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-attitudes |
| 副标题 | Two Mechanist Manife |
| 编辑 | Alex Walter |
| 视频video | |
| 概述 | Challenges evolutionary psychologists’ philosophical commitment to propositional-attitude (i.e. language of thought [LOT]) models of cognition.Explores disagreements between Evolutionary Psychology an |
| 丛书名称 | SpringerBriefs in Philosophy |
| 图书封面 |  |
| 描述 | The two essays provide a critical examination of theory and research in the field of evolutionary psychology. The view advanced here is that philosophical materialism and minimalist assumptions about adaptation serve Darwinian psychology better than the more popular alternative view that relies on cognitive dualism and propositional-attitude psychology to formulate evolutionary psychology theory. A commitment to cognitive dualism is destined to undermine the physical basis of behavior upon which evolutionary theory depends. Many evolutionary psychologists do not see this but are seduced by the easy way in which hypotheses can be formulated using the ‘propositional-attitude’ model. The challenge is to develop a materialistic and mechanistic approach to understanding human cognition and behavior, including linguistic and social behavior. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2012 |
| 关键词 | Propositional-attitudes; evo-devo; evolutionary psychology; mind/body dualism; modularity; motivation |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2969-8 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-94-007-2968-1 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-94-007-2969-8Series ISSN 2211-4548 Series E-ISSN 2211-4556 |
| issn_series | 2211-4548 |
| copyright | The author(s) 2012 |
发表于 2025-3-21 16:28:54
