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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38262-8 their boyar retinue and their boyars’ own retainers (the . and .). During emergencies, this could be augmented by forming an improvised peasant militia, and by invoking treaty obligations to call up the retinues of the princes of cadet lines of Moscow’s Danilovich house and those of the other clans

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47614-4h an approach is attractive to some commentators, for it permits a ready counterpointing of Revolutionary novelty and . conservatism, a contrast that can be held to account for the military success of the Revolutionary forces; but the reality was far more complex. It is necessary to understand the d

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31097-3r ‘rebellious’ provinces in the Low Countries had been interrupted in 1609 by a twelve-year truce, and the long war between the Emperor and the Sultan which had begun in 1593 was ended in 1606 by the treaty of Zsitvatorok. Peace between Turkey and the Austrian Habsburgs remained somewhat uneasy, sma

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,Gaelic Warfare 1453–1815,, uniform model represented by the ‘Great Powers’ of the early modern era: Spain, France, England, the Netherlands and Sweden, among others. The Scots and Irish combined mobility with devastating offensive shock power, thus falling outside Michael Roberts’s ‘military revolution’ paradigm.

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