书目名称 | Essays on Wage Bargaining in Dynamic Macroeconomics |
编辑 | Oliver Claas |
视频video | http://file.papertrans.cn/316/315346/315346.mp4 |
概述 | Embeds three variants of collective bargaining into a unified monetary macroeconomic framework.Provides full characterization of temporary equilibria under bargaining.Analyzes perfect-foresight dynami |
丛书名称 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
图书封面 |  |
描述 | This book addresses collective bargaining in an intertemporal monetary macroeconomy of the aggregate supply–aggregate demand (AS–AD) type with overlapping generations of consumers and with a public sector. The results are presented in a unified framework with a commodity market that clears competitively. By analyzing the implications of three variants of collective bargaining – efficient bargaining in a uniform and a segmented labor market and “right-to-manage” wage bargaining – it identifies the quantity of money, price expectations, union power, and union size as the determinants of temporary equilibria. In the three scenarios, it characterizes and compares the temporary equilibria using both analytical and numerical techniques, with an emphasis on allocations, welfare, and efficiency. It also discusses the dynamic evolution under rational expectations and its steady states in nominal and real terms. Lastly, it demonstrates conditions for stability regarding a balanced monetary expansion of the economy. |
出版日期 | Book 2019 |
关键词 | Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage wage bargaining; Nash bargaining; Segmented labor markets; Wage di |
版次 | 1 |
doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97828-4 |
isbn_softcover | 978-3-319-97827-7 |
isbn_ebook | 978-3-319-97828-4Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
issn_series | 0075-8442 |
copyright | Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 |