Titlebook: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision; Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer Book 2011 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nat

玉米

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Book 2011conomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically as

Ostrich

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CLASH

Arkendu Sen,Lakshmi Selvaratnamesearch in microeconomics in the last three decades. Emphasizing the importance of unverifiable actions and privately held information, contract theory provides formal tools to analyze various aspects of the organization of economic activities and relationships. For instance, issues as diverse as th

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The Current Situation and Future Challengesased services in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned to a single private-sector enti

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,Trust Negotiation and Its Applications,ion structure is exogenously given, more recently a relatively small literature has emerged in which the agent is not privately informed from the outset, but has the ability to acquire private information; i.e., the information structure is endogenous.

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Collaborative Business und Web Servicesufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.

平淡而无味

Oil—The Turbulent Years (1979–2001)tions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.