找回密码
 To register

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

[复制链接]
楼主: Considerate
发表于 2025-3-25 04:52:34 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-25 07:31:23 | 显示全部楼层
Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests,llison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp 97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.
发表于 2025-3-25 12:09:56 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-25 17:34:49 | 显示全部楼层
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests,cess function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.
发表于 2025-3-25 22:53:29 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-26 02:45:09 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-26 06:09:46 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-26 10:38:19 | 显示全部楼层
发表于 2025-3-26 14:40:21 | 显示全部楼层
Applications of Soft Computing for the Webe two groups. We show how a fictitious game with “most inefficient fictitious contenders” can be constructed to prove the existence of a unique group-proof Nash equilibrium of the original two-group contest game. An example evidences that cautious arguments on the (twice) differentiability of cost functions must be used in such a construction.
发表于 2025-3-26 18:50:19 | 显示全部楼层
 关于派博传思  派博传思旗下网站  友情链接
派博传思介绍 公司地理位置 论文服务流程 影响因子官网 SITEMAP 大讲堂 北京大学 Oxford Uni. Harvard Uni.
发展历史沿革 期刊点评 投稿经验总结 SCIENCEGARD IMPACTFACTOR 派博系数 清华大学 Yale Uni. Stanford Uni.
|Archiver|手机版|小黑屋| 派博传思国际 ( 京公网安备110108008328) GMT+8, 2025-5-26 06:08
Copyright © 2001-2015 派博传思   京公网安备110108008328 版权所有 All rights reserved
快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表