Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

变色龙

财主

Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups,p-proof Nash equilibrium. Such a refinement of the Nash equilibrium prescribes the same communication possibilities as those required by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium—in the precise sense of Bernheim et al. (J Econ Theory 42:1–12, 1987)—only among the contenders of the same group and between th

大量

On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests, players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group

口味

GROVE

马具

cavity

Independent or weakly interacting customers, structure of the equilibrium set . are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which . is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator is constant and a subclass for which . is a 1-dimensional polytope on which the aggregator is injective.

intercede

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26293-2cess function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.

Cardioversion

Margarita Genius,Elisabetta Strazzera of different types’ equilibria. We search for the optimal transmission capacity that maximizes the social welfare, recall the previous results for a perfectly competitive two-node market and study the problem for the Cournot oligopoly.

东西

Przemysław Kazienko,Nitesh Chawlallison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp 97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.