Titlebook: Epistemic Entitlement; The Right to Believe Hannes Ole Matthiessen Book 2014 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

消耗

英寸

Harrowing

障碍

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-6959-0 shopping list, checking to see whether it is complete. Have we still got onions? I don’t know. I ask my girlfriend; she also doesn’t know. She opens the cupboard, takes a look inside and says, ‘There are still plenty. No need to buy onions today.’ Now we both know that there are plenty of onions an

evaculate

AGONY

Aufbau der verwendeten Messsysteme,unded in perceptual states. The aim of this chapter is to challenge this view. As I suggested in the Introduction, the most natural response to a question as to whether a person bears a positive epistemic status often consists in pointing to her perceptual situation. The example I gave was someone w

Schlemms-Canal

conscribe

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-88579-1f theses about epistemic entitlements from the current literature and departed from it by construing epistemic entitlement in terms of the publicly observable conditions that ground it rather than as a (weakly) internalist epistemic status. While the standard account regards perceptual states as a p

Encapsulate

crucial

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-29605-6ws that, say, there are plenty of onions in the cupboard is to refer to the knower’s perceptual situation by saying something like ‘Well, she just looked into the cupboard.’ Attributions of perceptual knowledge are normally based on the attributee being in the right kind of position to tell, while t