Titlebook: Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government; Carl Dahlström (Professor),Lena Wängnerud (Profess Book 2015 The Editor(s) (if applica

漫步

包庇

Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Governmentprime minister. In contrast to other niche parties, which only rarely have assumed any prominent governmental positions, it is thus possible to actually examine what ‘Anti-Corruption Parties’ or ACPs actually accomplish once in power. In this chapter, we summarize and discuss our findings in this area.

发芽

Rulers and Their Elite Rivals: How Democratization Has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Sa Crawford, 2011), indicators of quality of government show decline, despite theoretical expectations that democracy should lead to improvements. This chapter contributes a theoretical argument, focused on elite–ruler relations, that explains the mismatch between our existing theories and observed empirical realities in Africa.

Accommodation

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仔细检查

Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites’ Rotation and Asset Ownership to do so they establish extractive institutions instead of inclusive ones that would be serving the society at large (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Inclusive institutions are more likely to be observed in democracies, and this suggests a positive correlation between institutional and democratic quality.

maintenance

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39767-1akis et al., Chapter 16 in this volume). This does not mean that electoral accountability can be neglected in studies on corruption and good governance—it only means that we need to find new ways to analyze how this mechanism works in different settings.

TSH582

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85910-5r honors and adheres to the institutional framework there may ensue positive spirals toward higher quality of government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011, 2014; North et al. 2009; Rothstein 2011).

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非实体

How Institutions Constrain Elites from Destructive Behaviorr honors and adheres to the institutional framework there may ensue positive spirals toward higher quality of government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011, 2014; North et al. 2009; Rothstein 2011).