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Titlebook: Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications; Alain Haurie,Georges Zaccour Book 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 economics.game theory.management.mo

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Leistungsabgabe und Energielieferung,the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist Operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4lts in higher R&D Investments compared to Bertrand‘s. These results show that the relative efficiencies of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are sensitive to the suggested specifications, and hence far from being robust.
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4be represented in the slow time scale whereas the economic adjustments are represented in the fast time scale as solutions of general economic equilibrium models. We provide some indications on the integration of different classes of models that could be made, using an hierarchical game theoretic structure.
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Olaf Göttgens,Sven Dörrenbächeryed over an infinite horizon, with manufacturers as leaders. Stationary feedback equilibria are computed, and numerical simulations are carried out in order to illustrate how channel members should allocate their marketing efforts.
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Podcasts als Kommunikationsinstruments agree to form a cartel. In particular, one firm has absolute and marginal cost advantage over the other forcing one of the firms to become a dormant firm. A subgame consistent solution based on the Nash bargaining axioms is derived.
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Incentive Strategies for Shelf-Space Allocation in Duopolies,yed over an infinite horizon, with manufacturers as leaders. Stationary feedback equilibria are computed, and numerical simulations are carried out in order to illustrate how channel members should allocate their marketing efforts.
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