Titlebook: Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications; Alain Haurie,Georges Zaccour Book 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 economics.game theory.management.mo

甜食

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4ciple and based on it solution concepts are introduced. The new concept of “imputation distribution procedure” is defined connected with the basic definitions of time-consistency and strongly time-consistency. Sufficient conditions of the existence of time-consistent solutions are derived. For a lar

neoplasm

龙虾

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 is to derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, and then examine the robustness of the literature‘s results, especially those of Qiu (1997). We find that The main results of this study are as follows: (a) Bertrand competition is more efficient if R&D productivity is low, industry spillove

Macronutrients

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator‘s decisions, albeit at a cost. The proportion of Believers and Non-Believers changes over time depending on the relative profits of both groups. We show that the Regulator can use mis

Ointment

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4ls of climate change policies. We exploit the well recognized fact that the climate and economic Subsystems evolve at very different time scales. We formulate the international negotiation at the level of climate control as a piecewise deterministic stochastic game played in the “slow” time scale, w

chassis

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 and may also introduce a private label at a lower price than the manufacturer‘s brand. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first assess in a dynamic context the impact of a private label introduction on the players‘ payoffs. If this is beneficial for the retailer to propose his brand to consumers

诽谤

使服水土

Podcasts als Kommunikationsinstrumentn of the solution policy to a later starting time and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal. Hence no players will have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. Recently a general mechanism for the derivation of payoff distribution procedur

Critical

娘娘腔