Titlebook: Differential Games and Applications; Tamer S. Başar,Pierre Bernhard Conference proceedings 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989 Mat

凹室

Repeated bargaining under uncertainty,act, which is expressed by the weights of the individual objectives. At the top level the contract is determined by solving an algebraic equation such that the rationality axioms of the Nash bargaining scheme are satisfied for the whole time interval of cooperation.

STENT

Incorruptible

谷物

Histopathology of Retinoblastomagy for the misère version, the regular game remains unsolved in general. In previous papers we derived basic properties of the regular game, found criteria under which one hand is guaranteed to be better than another, and determined the value functions in several special cases. In this paper we comp

嫌恶

真实的你

A PDE framework for games of pursuit-evasion type,he Isaacs equation coupled with certain singular boundary conditions. Moreover the upper and lower values of the game are compared by PDE methods, as well as the corresponding "capturability" sets, and, under the Isaacs condition, it is shown that the game has a value.

Substance-Abuse

BRACE

palliate

Nash-cournot equilibria in the buropean gas market: A case where open-loop and feedback solutions chave infinite private reserves and production capacities (or alternatively the expansion of the production capacities is exogeneous) then Nash open-loop and feedback equilibria coincide. Second, we show that these conditions correspond to a fairly good approximation of the European gas market and hence the practical importance of our result.

洞穴

The theory of teams: A selective annotated bibliography,‘s. In drawing papers from the vast literature in this area we have been rather selective, concentrating on stochastic models rather than deterministic, and highlighting those papers which have made (or, for more recent publications, have the potential to make) major impact on research in this area.