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Titlebook: Differential Games and Applications; Tamer S. Başar,Pierre Bernhard Conference proceedings 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989 Mat

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书目名称Differential Games and Applications
编辑Tamer S. Başar,Pierre Bernhard
视频video
丛书名称Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences
图书封面Titlebook: Differential Games and Applications;  Tamer S. Başar,Pierre Bernhard Conference proceedings 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989 Mat
描述This volume contains fifteen articles on the topic of differential and dynamic games, focusing on both theory and applications. It covers a variety of areas and presents recent developments on topics of current interest. It should be useful to researchers in differential and dynamic games, systems and control, operations research and mathematical economics.
出版日期Conference proceedings 1989
关键词Mathematica; control; differential games; feedback; mathematical economics; operations research; partial d
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004258
isbn_softcover978-3-540-50758-1
isbn_ebook978-3-540-46079-4Series ISSN 0170-8643 Series E-ISSN 1610-7411
issn_series 0170-8643
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1989
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On a class of zero-sum discrete games with delayed information,rs, corresponding to possible (discrete) positions of . on the real line. At time . occupies a position .=.., and makes a move to a possibly different position ..=.., where .. ε Z, such that |..|≤. being a fixed positive integer. Let . and . also be two positive integers, with .≤. being another fixe
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A PDE framework for games of pursuit-evasion type,he Isaacs equation coupled with certain singular boundary conditions. Moreover the upper and lower values of the game are compared by PDE methods, as well as the corresponding "capturability" sets, and, under the Isaacs condition, it is shown that the game has a value.
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A feedback guidance for pre-launch maneuvering in medium range air combat with missiles,ork in a response mode to take advantage of the opponent‘s strategy errors. The method is based on miss distances resulting from hypothetical missile exchanges. Thus it is computationally expensive, since each evaluation of the guidance law requires a set of missile/target simulations. The performan
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Guidance law synthesis based on a planar pursuit-evasion game solution,imal strategy of the missile as a function of the current and final values of the state variables. Based on this solution a feedback guidance law for a real time implementation is synthesized. The performance achieved by this guidance law is substantially superior to proportional navigation and only
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Piecewise deterministic differential games, successive random jump times the process is fully deterministic. It is possible to consider two classes of strategies, the usual feedback strategies and the so-called . strategies in which an open-loop control is adapted by each player at a jump time. The characterization and the existence of equil
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Repeated bargaining under uncertainty,racting takes place at each stage on the basis of the available information. A two-level hierarchical method to handle such problems is presented. At the lower level a weighted sum of the decision makers‘ objectives is maximized. This corresponds to solving the cooperative problem with a given contr
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