Titlebook: Cyber-Security in Critical Infrastructures; A Game-Theoretic App Stefan Rass,Stefan Schauer,Quanyan Zhu Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerla

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Cryptographic Gamesr, or system security in a more general setting that includes quantitative security with help of game theory. Game theory and cryptography are, however, of mutual value for each other, since game theory can help designing self-enforcing security of cryptographic protocols, and cryptography contribut

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Practicalitiesechniques that can be helpful to instantiate models. Furthermore, we review a set of selected software tools that help with the setup and equilibrium analysis of practical game theoretic models. We revisit various examples throughout the book in a tutorial-like step-by-step approach describing how g

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Book 2020 contemporary reports on security incidents of various kinds, we can see a paradigm shift to attacks of an increasingly heterogeneous nature, combining different techniques into what we know as an advanced persistent threat. Security precautions must match these diverse threat patterns in an equally

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Types of Gamesion-valued games can handle). Each game description is accompanied by examples from the security domain to motivate and illustrate the use of the individual model. Each class of game is discussed in relation to the other types, highlighting pros and cons, las well as applications, detailed in later chapters.

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Zusammenfassung und Schlussfolgerungen of simulation methods that help to model and estimate possible effects of security incidents across interwoven infrastructures. Such simulation models form an invaluable source of information and data for the subsequent construction of game-theoretic security models discussed in the rest of the book.

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Hanspeter Kriesi,Laurent Bernhard paradigm. This establishes valuable lessons for the construction of games, say if payoff models are constructed from subjective data (interviews, expert estimates, or similar), but also highlights the need to consider individual risk perception and attitude though the utility function design in a game theoretic model.